US China expert Kenneth Lieberthal criticises Japan

Kenneth Lieberthal is talking in riddles. Some say he is quoted out of context by the Chinese media. Others thought that he was speaking with a conscience. Or was this a Freudian slip? 

China's economic and military leverage has certainly strengthened in recent years. 

Unlike most who sided with Japan recently, Lieberthal ought to know the history well. Japan's acquisition of the islands was a gift on the silver platter from American troops at a time when China was weak and rebuilding the country, unable to resist losing its territories to aggressors. 

Japan and its supporters cannot change the facts that the islands were under Chinese jurisdiction during the Ming dynasty with documented evidence and the recognition accorded by the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration.   

If Japan indeed believes that it has a strong case, it would not need to posture, nationalise or buy up the Diaoyutai islands. Whether by historical or territorial boundaries, Japan lacks ammunition to stake claims, except with its loud complaining voice and encouragement of its military ally. It is orchestrated with the Philippines and Vietnam to exert pressure on China when it's vulnerable during leadership change.

Japan broke consensus with China on Diaoyu Islands

Updated: 2012-09-21  

WASHINGTON - The Japanese government's bid to "nationalize" the Diaoyu Islands hadbroken its consensus with China to shelve the territorial dispute, a US expert said Thursday. 

"First of all, I think that Japan's actions have been key in explaining what China has done," saidKenneth Lieberthal, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who had been the seniordirector for Asia at the National Security Council in the Clinton administration.

Speaking at a symposium at the Washington-based think tank, he also admitted it was a "hugemistake" when US government officials made comments that suggested Washington did have aposition on the dispute. 

"I think that does us no good. And occasionally, some comments like that have come out,"Lieberthal said. "I think that they are regrettable."

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2012-09/21/content_15774792.htm

http://www.bloomberg.com/video/63260542-brookings-s-lieberthal-interview-on-china-s-diplomacy.html

Nevertheless, China should not, has not and would not throw away what its hard won respect and gains built up over the years through diplomacy.  As we write, both countries are holding consultations. Clearly escalation would neither benefit China nor Japan. 

The onus is really on Japan to resolve the crisis fairly. This is unlikely with a right-wing domination of the Japanese government bent on militarising bilateral issues at the expense of economic benefits and regional stability. However, China unlike the US does not partake in regime change around the world. 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/25/c_131872241.htm

America's China Choices - sharing power balance in Asia

How many Americans ponder deeper into longer term strategic questions?  


             The China choice: why America should share power by Hugh White

The Chinese will continue to avoid unnecessary friction and minimise the risk of confrontation. But they will not relinquish their country’s claim to status as a great power – even if that leads to conflict. The implications of this for America are simple and very significant. If America tries to preserve the status quo and avoid fundamental change in the relationship, it will be choosing to accept China as a strategic rival.

Essentially, America has three options. It can resist China’s challenge and try to preserve the status quo in Asia. It can step back from its dominant role in Asia, leaving China to attempt to establish hegemony. Or it can remain in Asia on a new basis, allowing China a larger role but also maintaining a strong presence of its own. Most Americans assume that the first of these options is the only choice. Only a few take the second option seriously, although that could change. Most don’t even consider the third.

The need for a decision seems to have emerged very suddenly. China’s economic growth has been obvious, but not where it has been leading. 

In truth, any attempt by either Beijing or Washington to dominate will lead to sustained and bitter strategic rivalry, imposing huge economic costs and a real risk of catastrophic war. Neither side could win, and both would stand to lose a great deal – but it could easily happen. Strategic competition quickly builds its own momentum, escalating to the point where war can seem inescapable. War between the United States and China is already a clear and significant danger, one that will grow if rivalry increases. This is the most important issue at stake in America’s China choice. Asia’s alternative futures are not American or Chinese supremacy. They are escalating rivalry, or some form of great-power accommodation that constrains that rivalry. America’s real choice is not between dominating or withdrawing from Asia: it is between taking China on as a strategic rival, or working with it as a partner.

The third option carries many obvious risks, which would quickly rule it out of contention were it not for the greater risks that flow from the alternatives. Moreover, this option can only be realised if America and China are willing to compromise with each other. Neither side will find that easy. For China it will mean abandoning hopes to lead Asia and accepting a strong US presence there indefinitely. For America it will mean accepting that its unique leadership role is no longer feasible, and learning to work with China as a partner in a way that America has never done with another country before – and certainly not with one so different from it. But this is the kind of choice America must now consider.

http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/extract-china-choice-why-america-should-share-power

Secret war chapter missing in the public version of Australia's defence white paper

Who wants to fight a war? 

Not surprising, there are some who may benefit from wars. 

That's what the hushed up section of the defence white paper issued during PM Kevin Rudd's leadership. This was revealed in  a new book, The Kingdom and the Quarry: China, Australia, Fear and Greed.  

The Australian military establishment, like that of the US and other countries, have an interest in lobbying for increase defence spending against a played up enemy. Force 2030 set out in the white paper was to acquire 12 big conventional submarines with missiles, revolutionary Joint Strike Fighters, air warfare destroyers and giant landing ships to prepare for possible war with Australia's main trade partner. 

Unfortunately, it is dangerous weapons, human lives and properties that warmongers are toying with. It seems much easier to create enemies than enhance friendly relations in the post-Cold War era. 

Consistent with the overall strategic policy is reliance on close friendship with US at whatever costs. However, the contagion of global economic woes and other economic priorities has put pressure on the Gillard government to cut defence spending. 

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/secret-war-with-china-uncovered/story-fn59nm2j-1226381002984

"  A new book, The Kingdom and the Quarry: China, Australia, Fear and Greed, reveals how Force 2030 set out in the white paper - to include 12 big conventional submarines with missiles, revolutionary Joint Strike Fighters, air warfare destroyers and giant landing ships - was being prepared for a possible war with Australia's main trading partner.

In the lead-up to the release of the paper in May 2009, The Australian reported extensively on the debate among Australia's security and intelligence agencies over whether China was likely to pose a threat as it increased investment in its armed forces.

The public version of the paper stopped short of declaring that war with China was what the authors feared. To avoid offending the Chinese, and to create a degree of deniability, discussion of possible future conflict relied on euphemisms such as a "major power adversary".

 Even the sanitised public version of the white paper was enough to upset the Chinese. They asked Mr Pezzullo to revise the description of the regional security environment and, in particular, the references to China's military modernisation.

The Beijing media said the white paper was a victory for the "hawks" in Australia's defence establishment and that was partly because Mr Rudd wanted to show himself to the electorate as tough on China, to show loyalty to the US and to give Australia an excuse to increase its forces."